This is so clever.
HT: David Beckworth
Wednesday, May 8, 2013
Friday, May 3, 2013
Another "Austrian" Critique of Market Monetarism 3
Scott Ritenour wrote a critique of Market Monetarism. I responded to his criticism of our supposed failings of basic theory here. I responded to his criticism of our view of the role of expectations here. Here I will discuss Ritenour's claim that Market Monetarists fail to understand the consequences of keeping nominal GDP on target.
The market process by which an increase in the demand to hold money in the face of a fixed quantity of money leads to lower prices and wages and so an increase in the real quantity of money includes reduced money expenditures on goods and services. Nominal GDP level targeting requires that instead the nominal quantity of money rise to match any increase in the demand to hold money. Those particular people who choose to hold money reduce their expenditures on whatever goods, services, or financial assets they value less than the additional money balances. The newly-issued money is spent in some particular place or other. This could easily impact relative prices and the allocation of resources. The effect is exactly what would happen if those choosing to hold more money had instead spent that money on whatever those issuing the money purchased. The market economic system is especially good at making adjustments in the allocation of resources in response to just these sorts of changes in the composition of demand.
With a credit money system, those who choose to hold more money are choosing to accumulate a particular type of financial asset, and the banks (private or central) issue money by purchasing other financial assets--banks are financial intermediaries. If the quantity of money rises with the demand to hold money, the effects are exactly as if those accumulating the additional money had instead accumulated whatever financial assets (loans or securities) purchased by the banks with the newly-issued money.
The market process by which a reduction in consumption spending used to purchase financial assets results in lower market interest rates and more investment spending is reasonably well understood. This shift in the relative demands for different types of goods results in an appropriate reallocation of resources. Further, a shift in demand between different sorts of financial assets also results in adjustments in relative yields. This may result in some shift in the allocation of resources as well, but it is part of the normal operations of financial markets. If investors sell one company's bonds and purchase another company's bonds, it is not neutral, but neither is it disruptive.
As for the change in the real distribution of income, it is correct that an unanticipated deflation of prices would have resulted in an unanticipated transfer of wealth from debtors to creditors . Nominal GDP level targeting prevents this from occurring. So, the unanticipated gain that all creditors, including those holding money, would have received under a constant money supply regime would not occur. On the other hand, both the supply and demand for credit depend on the regime. It is illegitimate to focus on just this one comparison. In particular, nominal GDP targeting protects creditors from the impact of unanticipated inflation due to a decrease in the demand to hold money in the face of a constant quantity of money.
When considering the trend growth rate of nominal GDP, the higher the growth rate, the higher the nominal interest rate that creditors receive from debtors. Again, with a credit money system, that part of the money supply that bears interest, which is most of it, would pay a higher nominal interest rate due to a higher trend growth rate of nominal GDP. Interestingly, the amount of money people hold in checkable accounts of various sorts will constantly grow exactly in proportion to what each person is holding. For example, constant nominal GDP as suggested by Hayek or else the sort of "productivity norm" proposed by Selgin, would make holding hand-to-hand currency more attractive relative to checkable deposits. The nominal interest rate paid on checkable deposits would be lower, though the real return on them would be approximately the same.
The problem with this common trope of Austrian economics repeated here by Ritenour is that it is really just simplistic "intellectual ammunition" trotted out in response to the helicopter drop thought experiment. To take an even more unrealistic extreme, there is Hume's thought experiment of every one's money balance unexpectedly doubling overnight. Is the creation of money perfectly neutral? No, claim the Austrians and they are even willing to nitpick the helicopter chimera and Hume's magic.
I don't think that money creation is neutral in the real world. Exactly what it does depends on details of the monetary regime. But where some Austrians go wrong is in claiming that these nonneutralities are especially disruptive. In my view, any nonneutralities involved with money creation constrained by nominal GDP level targeting will not create any serious problems.
Ritenour continues:
The first statement is false on its face. "Credit expansion?" For example, suppose people reduce spending on consumer goods and purchase bonds. This is an expansion in credit. The price of bonds rise and the yields fall. Firms respond to the lower cost of funds by selling additional bonds to fund production process that are more round about. The quantity of credit has expanded. The interest rate has fallen. But there has been a change in "social time preference" (though I find that an awkward way to characterize an increase in saving supply.) There has been an increase in voluntary saving and there is no reason to anticipate malinvestment.
Of course, Ritenour was being a bit sloppy, and by "credit expansion," he had in mind an increase in the supply of credit generated by an increase in the quantity of money. However, if the demand for money had not increased, then the resulting excess supply of money would result in greater expenditure on output, pushing nominal GDP above target. Nominal GDP level targeting is inconsistent with "out of the blue" credit expansions. As explained above, if the demand for money increased while consumption spending decreased, then the effect of the credit expansion is exactly as if the savers had purchased some other sort of financial assets directly. They are reducing current consumption and saving by accumulating money balances. By consuming less now, they free up resources to allow for more round about methods of production. The purchases of securities by banks (including central banks) or the new bank loans provide funds to entrepreneurs to undertake these more capital-intensive projects.
Of course, if the increase in the demand for money occurs through households or firms spending fewer current receipts on other sorts of financial assets, then there is just a change in the composition of financial assets being held. It is as if those accumulating the greater money balances had instead directly purchased the bonds that the banks purchased or made the loans the banks made. Finally, it is possible to accumulate money balances by selling financial assets. While this would not necessarily be "neutral," it would have no obvious impact on the degree to which production is round about. The result is the same as if those accumulating money balances had sold their assets and purchased the ones that the banks purchase.
Ritenour's problem here is that he continues to pound the same square pegs into round holes. He, like to many Austrians, remains fixated on the thought experiment where the quantity of money rises while the demand for money, the supply of saving, and the demand for investment are all held constant. While the possibility of changes the demand for money and the supply of saving is recognized (and the demand for investment is balled up in there with the supply of saving in some way,) any such changes are assumed to already shift to a new equilibrium assuming a constant quantity of money. Then the change in the quantity of money and matching credit expansion are assumed to occur from that equilibrium.
But that is an absurd approach. What happens when the supply of saving and the demand for money both change and the quantity of money changes with the demand to hold money? If it all happens at once, you can't break it down and describe a disequilibrium adjustment process for only a single part. Admittedly, Hayek tended to focus on booms that occurred due to an increase in the demand for investment, and a monetary regime that failed to raise interest rates enough to keep nominal spending stable. However, to the degree that the higher interest rates generate an increased quantity of saving supplied, a "credit expansion" is appropriate. Further, to the degree that higher interest rates on checkable deposits result in a greater demand for money, funding at least part of that added credit through additional money balances is also appropriate. Naturally, those adjustments would be consistent with keeping the level of nominal GDP on target.
Ritenour then continues:
Here he goes beyond error to offense. Market Monetarists in no way propose to use monetary inflation to overcome scarcity. On the contrary, Market Monetarists aim to keep spending on output growing at a slow stable rate. We believe that this will have the consequence of reducing both the frequency and duration of periods where actual production remains below the maximum amount possible given the reality of scarcity. Further, we believe that it will reduce both the frequency and duration of periods where spending growth exceeds expansions in the amount that can be produced consistent with scarcity. I use the term "potential output" to refer to just that--the maximum that can be produced subject to the constraint of scarcity.
Why does Ritenour make what is an absurd charge? It is because over 100 years ago, Mises was very interested in refuting claims that an expansionary monetary policy can (and should) be used to permanently reduce real interest rates. Many of those making such proposals promised that this would not only mitigate the scarcity of capital, but could go so far as abolish it. And many considered its chief benefit to be to raise labor's factor share in income at least somewhat, perhaps even to 100%.
Well, Market Monetarists have not argued that expansions in the quantity of money will permanently lower interest rates or that this would be a good thing because it would result in a larger capital stock or promote social justice by impacting the factor distribution of income. Hardly anyone else makes these sorts of arguments either. (Perhaps post-Keynesians or Modern Monetary theorists go there still.)
Market Monetarists have pointed out that it is possible for an increase in the quantity of money to be associated with increased nominal and real interest rates. Admittedly, these are special scenarios associated with the introduction of a nominal GDP level targeting regime in the context of a previously existing shortage of money that has already pushed real output below the level consistent with scarcity. More generally, Market Monetarists would like to see market forces determine all interest rates, and that those interest rates should be at levels that coordinate saving and investment at levels of real output and income consistent with the constraint imposed by scarcity. We argue that slow steady growth in spending on output is the least bad macroeconomic environment to maintain this sort of coordination.
Still, it is difficult to see how anyone who knows anything about the Market Monetarist approach could make the absurd accusation that we seek to use monetary inflation to overcome scarcity. The best excuse, I guess, is again the effort to pound the square pegs into the round holes--repeating Mises' arguments against his foes from more than 100 years ago.
Monetary inflation, therefore, will affect demands for certain goods first and then subsequent demands for different goods as the new money is spread through the economy. The step-by-step adjustment process during which the new money is absorbed necessarily results in real changes in relative prices and a real redistribution of wealth (Mises 1929, pp. 85-88; Mises 1938; Salerno 2010, pp. 202-03).
The market process by which an increase in the demand to hold money in the face of a fixed quantity of money leads to lower prices and wages and so an increase in the real quantity of money includes reduced money expenditures on goods and services. Nominal GDP level targeting requires that instead the nominal quantity of money rise to match any increase in the demand to hold money. Those particular people who choose to hold money reduce their expenditures on whatever goods, services, or financial assets they value less than the additional money balances. The newly-issued money is spent in some particular place or other. This could easily impact relative prices and the allocation of resources. The effect is exactly what would happen if those choosing to hold more money had instead spent that money on whatever those issuing the money purchased. The market economic system is especially good at making adjustments in the allocation of resources in response to just these sorts of changes in the composition of demand.
With a credit money system, those who choose to hold more money are choosing to accumulate a particular type of financial asset, and the banks (private or central) issue money by purchasing other financial assets--banks are financial intermediaries. If the quantity of money rises with the demand to hold money, the effects are exactly as if those accumulating the additional money had instead accumulated whatever financial assets (loans or securities) purchased by the banks with the newly-issued money.
The market process by which a reduction in consumption spending used to purchase financial assets results in lower market interest rates and more investment spending is reasonably well understood. This shift in the relative demands for different types of goods results in an appropriate reallocation of resources. Further, a shift in demand between different sorts of financial assets also results in adjustments in relative yields. This may result in some shift in the allocation of resources as well, but it is part of the normal operations of financial markets. If investors sell one company's bonds and purchase another company's bonds, it is not neutral, but neither is it disruptive.
As for the change in the real distribution of income, it is correct that an unanticipated deflation of prices would have resulted in an unanticipated transfer of wealth from debtors to creditors . Nominal GDP level targeting prevents this from occurring. So, the unanticipated gain that all creditors, including those holding money, would have received under a constant money supply regime would not occur. On the other hand, both the supply and demand for credit depend on the regime. It is illegitimate to focus on just this one comparison. In particular, nominal GDP targeting protects creditors from the impact of unanticipated inflation due to a decrease in the demand to hold money in the face of a constant quantity of money.
When considering the trend growth rate of nominal GDP, the higher the growth rate, the higher the nominal interest rate that creditors receive from debtors. Again, with a credit money system, that part of the money supply that bears interest, which is most of it, would pay a higher nominal interest rate due to a higher trend growth rate of nominal GDP. Interestingly, the amount of money people hold in checkable accounts of various sorts will constantly grow exactly in proportion to what each person is holding. For example, constant nominal GDP as suggested by Hayek or else the sort of "productivity norm" proposed by Selgin, would make holding hand-to-hand currency more attractive relative to checkable deposits. The nominal interest rate paid on checkable deposits would be lower, though the real return on them would be approximately the same.
The problem with this common trope of Austrian economics repeated here by Ritenour is that it is really just simplistic "intellectual ammunition" trotted out in response to the helicopter drop thought experiment. To take an even more unrealistic extreme, there is Hume's thought experiment of every one's money balance unexpectedly doubling overnight. Is the creation of money perfectly neutral? No, claim the Austrians and they are even willing to nitpick the helicopter chimera and Hume's magic.
I don't think that money creation is neutral in the real world. Exactly what it does depends on details of the monetary regime. But where some Austrians go wrong is in claiming that these nonneutralities are especially disruptive. In my view, any nonneutralities involved with money creation constrained by nominal GDP level targeting will not create any serious problems.
Ritenour continues:
Credit expansion necessarily stimulates malinvestment by encouraging production processes that are too roundabout relative to social time preferences (Strigl 1934, pp. 120–33; Mises 1949, pp. 547–62; Garrison 2001; Rothbard 2004, pp. 994–1004; Hayek 2008, pp. 189–329; Huerta de Soto 2006, pp. 347–84; Salerno 2012). Without an increase in voluntary savings, longer production processes are not all able to be completed. This is the heart of the malinvestment problem.
The first statement is false on its face. "Credit expansion?" For example, suppose people reduce spending on consumer goods and purchase bonds. This is an expansion in credit. The price of bonds rise and the yields fall. Firms respond to the lower cost of funds by selling additional bonds to fund production process that are more round about. The quantity of credit has expanded. The interest rate has fallen. But there has been a change in "social time preference" (though I find that an awkward way to characterize an increase in saving supply.) There has been an increase in voluntary saving and there is no reason to anticipate malinvestment.
Of course, Ritenour was being a bit sloppy, and by "credit expansion," he had in mind an increase in the supply of credit generated by an increase in the quantity of money. However, if the demand for money had not increased, then the resulting excess supply of money would result in greater expenditure on output, pushing nominal GDP above target. Nominal GDP level targeting is inconsistent with "out of the blue" credit expansions. As explained above, if the demand for money increased while consumption spending decreased, then the effect of the credit expansion is exactly as if the savers had purchased some other sort of financial assets directly. They are reducing current consumption and saving by accumulating money balances. By consuming less now, they free up resources to allow for more round about methods of production. The purchases of securities by banks (including central banks) or the new bank loans provide funds to entrepreneurs to undertake these more capital-intensive projects.
Of course, if the increase in the demand for money occurs through households or firms spending fewer current receipts on other sorts of financial assets, then there is just a change in the composition of financial assets being held. It is as if those accumulating the greater money balances had instead directly purchased the bonds that the banks purchased or made the loans the banks made. Finally, it is possible to accumulate money balances by selling financial assets. While this would not necessarily be "neutral," it would have no obvious impact on the degree to which production is round about. The result is the same as if those accumulating money balances had sold their assets and purchased the ones that the banks purchase.
Ritenour's problem here is that he continues to pound the same square pegs into round holes. He, like to many Austrians, remains fixated on the thought experiment where the quantity of money rises while the demand for money, the supply of saving, and the demand for investment are all held constant. While the possibility of changes the demand for money and the supply of saving is recognized (and the demand for investment is balled up in there with the supply of saving in some way,) any such changes are assumed to already shift to a new equilibrium assuming a constant quantity of money. Then the change in the quantity of money and matching credit expansion are assumed to occur from that equilibrium.
But that is an absurd approach. What happens when the supply of saving and the demand for money both change and the quantity of money changes with the demand to hold money? If it all happens at once, you can't break it down and describe a disequilibrium adjustment process for only a single part. Admittedly, Hayek tended to focus on booms that occurred due to an increase in the demand for investment, and a monetary regime that failed to raise interest rates enough to keep nominal spending stable. However, to the degree that the higher interest rates generate an increased quantity of saving supplied, a "credit expansion" is appropriate. Further, to the degree that higher interest rates on checkable deposits result in a greater demand for money, funding at least part of that added credit through additional money balances is also appropriate. Naturally, those adjustments would be consistent with keeping the level of nominal GDP on target.
Ritenour then continues:
NGDP targeting advocates end up fostering the monetary illusion that scarcity can be overcome and prosperity can be achieved via monetary inflation.
Here he goes beyond error to offense. Market Monetarists in no way propose to use monetary inflation to overcome scarcity. On the contrary, Market Monetarists aim to keep spending on output growing at a slow stable rate. We believe that this will have the consequence of reducing both the frequency and duration of periods where actual production remains below the maximum amount possible given the reality of scarcity. Further, we believe that it will reduce both the frequency and duration of periods where spending growth exceeds expansions in the amount that can be produced consistent with scarcity. I use the term "potential output" to refer to just that--the maximum that can be produced subject to the constraint of scarcity.
Why does Ritenour make what is an absurd charge? It is because over 100 years ago, Mises was very interested in refuting claims that an expansionary monetary policy can (and should) be used to permanently reduce real interest rates. Many of those making such proposals promised that this would not only mitigate the scarcity of capital, but could go so far as abolish it. And many considered its chief benefit to be to raise labor's factor share in income at least somewhat, perhaps even to 100%.
Well, Market Monetarists have not argued that expansions in the quantity of money will permanently lower interest rates or that this would be a good thing because it would result in a larger capital stock or promote social justice by impacting the factor distribution of income. Hardly anyone else makes these sorts of arguments either. (Perhaps post-Keynesians or Modern Monetary theorists go there still.)
Market Monetarists have pointed out that it is possible for an increase in the quantity of money to be associated with increased nominal and real interest rates. Admittedly, these are special scenarios associated with the introduction of a nominal GDP level targeting regime in the context of a previously existing shortage of money that has already pushed real output below the level consistent with scarcity. More generally, Market Monetarists would like to see market forces determine all interest rates, and that those interest rates should be at levels that coordinate saving and investment at levels of real output and income consistent with the constraint imposed by scarcity. We argue that slow steady growth in spending on output is the least bad macroeconomic environment to maintain this sort of coordination.
Still, it is difficult to see how anyone who knows anything about the Market Monetarist approach could make the absurd accusation that we seek to use monetary inflation to overcome scarcity. The best excuse, I guess, is again the effort to pound the square pegs into the round holes--repeating Mises' arguments against his foes from more than 100 years ago.
Friday, April 26, 2013
Another "Austrian" Critique of Market Monetarism: Part 2
Shawn Ritenour critiqued Market Monetarism on the Mises.org blog. I responded to what he sees as our theoretical shortcomings here. He goes on to critique the Market Monetarist view of expectations:
Most Market Monetarists are skeptical that entrepreneurial errors in investment decisions lead to recession. They rather lead to losses for the particular entrepreneurs that made errors and are usually combined with profits for those entrepreneurs who made correct judgements. For example, an entrepreneur who continued committing resources to maintain the production of CD players loses money while the entrepreneur developing the ipod reaps great profits.
Ritenour argues that it is possible for entrepreneurs to reap profits despite reductions in nominal expenditure. This is true, of course. For example, it is possible for nominal expenditure to fall in aggregate, while nominal expenditure on some particular product rises. However, expectations of reduced nominal expenditure in the future would still result in reduced expenditure now.
Ritenour has in mind a different scenario where firms invest today because they expect that resource prices will fall more than final product prices in the future. In abstract, this is possible. In practice, it would seem a bit difficult unless the shift in money supply or demand were permanent and the adjustment process swift. While a firm spending now on relatively high priced capital goods would take a nominal loss after a general deflation of prices in the future, replacement costs of the capital goods and the real value of profits in terms of consumer goods would be the same. However, if the deflation is temporary, wouldn't the replacement costs be the same and the real profits permanently decreased? Further, a firm using debt to finance investment in the face of an expected deflation of prices and wages is asking to have net worth stripped away by creditors, one way or another.
This sort of reasoning suggests that expectations of recession and deflation bring the recession and deflation right away. If it is permanent, it causes whatever damage it will cause, and recovery, including real investment, can then begin in the context of lower prices and lower wages. If the deflation is temporary, then expectations of the deflation move it to the present as before, though expectations of recovery and a return of the price level to its previous value will also shift recovery nearer to the present.
Ritenour accuses Market Monetarists of inconsistency:
Market Monetarists, like most economists, don't accept Rothbard's assertion that recessions are about a "cluster of entrepreneurial errors." In my view, in a world of creative destruction, entrepreneurial error is rife. Contemplation of the rate business failure and the number of workers that are laid off even when real output and employment are both growing strongly suggest that the market system is quite able to somehow manage massive entrepreneurial error, but also substantial variation in error without there being a recession.
How is that possible? Here is one possibility. In the context of growing aggregate spending on output, business failure results in lower supply, higher prices, and higher nominal and real profits. This attracts more entry, allowing employment and production to recover, while reducing prices and profits return to their initial levels. While real business cycles due to variation in entrepreneurial error would seem possible, it appears that the corrective process works quite well.
Market Monetarists believe that in fact expected expenditure on output influences current expenditure on output. We also argue that a monetary regime that commits to return expenditure on output to a stable growth path as soon as possible will create expectations that will result in smaller decreases (or increases) of current spending on output relative to the target growth path than a regime where there is no such commitment. Further, given any such deviation, the return to the target growth path will be more prompt. A commitment to return nominal GDP to a target growth path will tend to keep spending on output on the target growth path.
Market Monetarists also believe that if prices and wages all adjusted more or less in proportion to the change in spending on output, real output and employment would not be much impacted by the change in spending on output. However, Market Monetarists believe that in fact prices and wages are very sticky with respect to shifts in spending on output, not only in their levels but in their growth trajectories.
Market Monetarists don't have any unusual explanation for sticky prices and wages. Unlike new classical economists and apparently some Austrians, we are willing to accept the evidence we see rather than insist on theoretical arguments that markets must always clear. My view is that the problem is one of coordination. If there were a single firm making price and wage offers, it could more easily adjust to shifts in spending on output. In the real world, the appropriate price and wage for each firm to set depends on what all the other firms will do.
I also recognize that this is true of spending on output. How much it is appropriate (or possible) for any one firm or household to spend depends on how much other households and firms are currently spending. But that doesn't mean that expectations of future spending don't directly impact spending now. The Market Monetarist view isn't that a commitment to keep nominal GDP on a target path is sufficient to keep nominal GDP on that path, it is just that it will do better than a monetary regime that makes no such commitment.
Of course, it is easy to find strong claims about rational expectations or efficient markets from Scott Sumner. And perhaps the plain English meaning of those words would seem to require that prices and wages be perfectly flexible. However, it is equally obvious that Sumner does not believe that wages are perfectly flexible. Sumner's use of those terms would imply that there is no contradiction in claiming that "markets" rationally and efficiently take into account that wages are in fact sticky.
On the other hand, I am a Market Monetarist and I am not at all comfortable with any strong statements about the efficiency of markets or rational expectations. From my "Virginia School" perspective, the relevant question is what institutions, including what monetary regime, is the least bad approach for generating good results from markets that are inefficient from the standard of perfection and expectations that may be well short of "rational" by some objective standard.
In my view, the proper goal of a monetary regime is to provide a stable macroeconomic environment for microeconomic coordination. This is in the context of constant change--creative destruction. In my view, slow, steady growth in spending on output is the best (least bad) approach. It isn't perfect. But a gold or silver standard, a fixed quantity or growth path of some measure of the quantity of money, or a stable price level or inflation rate are all worse.
For example, the market monetarists claim that it is expectations about future NGDP that solely determine present investment decisions and hence the direction of the economy. This claim fails to recognize that recessions are not merely the result of decreases in aggregate spending following a boom. They are the result of entrepreneurial error (Hulsmann 1998; Rothbard 2000, pp. 8-9). It is possible, for example, for entrepreneurs to reap profits even in an environment of declining total spending. What matters is not aggregate spending, but the spread between the price of products and the sum of the prices of the factors of production. If the total quantity of all spending in the social economy falls and overall prices fall, firms can still reap profits as long as they identify those projects at which the factors are underpriced relative to the future price of the product they can be used to produce.Market Monetarist do not claim "that it is expectations about future NGDP that solely determine present investment decisions and hence the direction of the economy. It is rather than we think that expectations about future NGDP are a very important influence on current spending decisions, which determine current NGDP. We believe that both investment and consumption decisions are influenced by expected NGDP, but we don't claim that nothing else influences them.
Most Market Monetarists are skeptical that entrepreneurial errors in investment decisions lead to recession. They rather lead to losses for the particular entrepreneurs that made errors and are usually combined with profits for those entrepreneurs who made correct judgements. For example, an entrepreneur who continued committing resources to maintain the production of CD players loses money while the entrepreneur developing the ipod reaps great profits.
Ritenour argues that it is possible for entrepreneurs to reap profits despite reductions in nominal expenditure. This is true, of course. For example, it is possible for nominal expenditure to fall in aggregate, while nominal expenditure on some particular product rises. However, expectations of reduced nominal expenditure in the future would still result in reduced expenditure now.
Ritenour has in mind a different scenario where firms invest today because they expect that resource prices will fall more than final product prices in the future. In abstract, this is possible. In practice, it would seem a bit difficult unless the shift in money supply or demand were permanent and the adjustment process swift. While a firm spending now on relatively high priced capital goods would take a nominal loss after a general deflation of prices in the future, replacement costs of the capital goods and the real value of profits in terms of consumer goods would be the same. However, if the deflation is temporary, wouldn't the replacement costs be the same and the real profits permanently decreased? Further, a firm using debt to finance investment in the face of an expected deflation of prices and wages is asking to have net worth stripped away by creditors, one way or another.
This sort of reasoning suggests that expectations of recession and deflation bring the recession and deflation right away. If it is permanent, it causes whatever damage it will cause, and recovery, including real investment, can then begin in the context of lower prices and lower wages. If the deflation is temporary, then expectations of the deflation move it to the present as before, though expectations of recovery and a return of the price level to its previous value will also shift recovery nearer to the present.
Ritenour accuses Market Monetarists of inconsistency:
Additionally, the form of expectations assumed is the source of a particular inconsistency in the market monetarist literature. This inconsistency, in turn, is also related to their failure to understand recessions as the result of a cluster of entrepreneurial error. Market monetarists assume that markets are efficient and forward looking. At the same time recessions are due to decreases in expected NGDP. If markets are efficient while forward looking, how can there be a cluster of entrepreneurial error? It seems that if market participants make efficient adjustments while looking forward, there should not be widespread mistakes made by entrepreneurs. If so, how can there be recession? Perhaps the response might be, as Christensen (2011, p. 5) implies, that although people have expectations that are indeed rational, they are not perfect. Even so, if market participants properly forecast that the Fed would not or could not continue to increase NGDP through 2008, why should there be a recession? If their forecast was correct, they should have acted accordingly and markets would clear, and at the very least there would not have been widespread persistent unemployment.
Market Monetarists, like most economists, don't accept Rothbard's assertion that recessions are about a "cluster of entrepreneurial errors." In my view, in a world of creative destruction, entrepreneurial error is rife. Contemplation of the rate business failure and the number of workers that are laid off even when real output and employment are both growing strongly suggest that the market system is quite able to somehow manage massive entrepreneurial error, but also substantial variation in error without there being a recession.
How is that possible? Here is one possibility. In the context of growing aggregate spending on output, business failure results in lower supply, higher prices, and higher nominal and real profits. This attracts more entry, allowing employment and production to recover, while reducing prices and profits return to their initial levels. While real business cycles due to variation in entrepreneurial error would seem possible, it appears that the corrective process works quite well.
Market Monetarists believe that in fact expected expenditure on output influences current expenditure on output. We also argue that a monetary regime that commits to return expenditure on output to a stable growth path as soon as possible will create expectations that will result in smaller decreases (or increases) of current spending on output relative to the target growth path than a regime where there is no such commitment. Further, given any such deviation, the return to the target growth path will be more prompt. A commitment to return nominal GDP to a target growth path will tend to keep spending on output on the target growth path.
Market Monetarists also believe that if prices and wages all adjusted more or less in proportion to the change in spending on output, real output and employment would not be much impacted by the change in spending on output. However, Market Monetarists believe that in fact prices and wages are very sticky with respect to shifts in spending on output, not only in their levels but in their growth trajectories.
Market Monetarists don't have any unusual explanation for sticky prices and wages. Unlike new classical economists and apparently some Austrians, we are willing to accept the evidence we see rather than insist on theoretical arguments that markets must always clear. My view is that the problem is one of coordination. If there were a single firm making price and wage offers, it could more easily adjust to shifts in spending on output. In the real world, the appropriate price and wage for each firm to set depends on what all the other firms will do.
I also recognize that this is true of spending on output. How much it is appropriate (or possible) for any one firm or household to spend depends on how much other households and firms are currently spending. But that doesn't mean that expectations of future spending don't directly impact spending now. The Market Monetarist view isn't that a commitment to keep nominal GDP on a target path is sufficient to keep nominal GDP on that path, it is just that it will do better than a monetary regime that makes no such commitment.
Of course, it is easy to find strong claims about rational expectations or efficient markets from Scott Sumner. And perhaps the plain English meaning of those words would seem to require that prices and wages be perfectly flexible. However, it is equally obvious that Sumner does not believe that wages are perfectly flexible. Sumner's use of those terms would imply that there is no contradiction in claiming that "markets" rationally and efficiently take into account that wages are in fact sticky.
On the other hand, I am a Market Monetarist and I am not at all comfortable with any strong statements about the efficiency of markets or rational expectations. From my "Virginia School" perspective, the relevant question is what institutions, including what monetary regime, is the least bad approach for generating good results from markets that are inefficient from the standard of perfection and expectations that may be well short of "rational" by some objective standard.
In my view, the proper goal of a monetary regime is to provide a stable macroeconomic environment for microeconomic coordination. This is in the context of constant change--creative destruction. In my view, slow, steady growth in spending on output is the best (least bad) approach. It isn't perfect. But a gold or silver standard, a fixed quantity or growth path of some measure of the quantity of money, or a stable price level or inflation rate are all worse.
Sunday, April 21, 2013
Another "Austrian" Critique of Market Monetarism: Part 1
Shawn Ritenour provides a critique of Market Monetarism on Mises.org. He charges:
Is there any truth to these claims? What about our "faulty theoretical framework?" He writes:
Well, I certainly have no particular dispute with his broad description of the market economy. I would add a bit more emphasis on creative destruction--innovation by entrepreneurs introducing new goods and services and new methods of producing existing goods and services.
So far, there is only one major difference. In my view, there is something in a market economy that is usefully framed as "aggregate demand." And further, it can equal "aggregate supply" at a single "price level." However, this framing of aggregate demand and supply is fully consistent with an understanding that a market order is a vast network of distinct markets. (I might add, interrelated markets.)
He goes on to discuss capital:
I certainly don't think of capital as "homogenous schmoo," and would even grant that investment is not a homogenous "I." Of course, the nominal volume of spending on newly produced capital goods is an actual flow of money expenditure. It is a sum of the amount spent on a variety of different things.
But then, literally identical drill press machines can be used for a variety of purposes--continuing to produce some variety of automobile that no one is going to want or else producing washing machines in an insufficient quantity to meet an unanticipated demand.
That doesn't make the role of the price of drill press machines in coordinating their supply and demand irrelevant. Still, even if the price of drill press machines does coordinate the supply and demand for drill press machines, there is no guarantee that people will want to purchase all of the cars that some of the drill press machines were used to produce. For example, some other entrepreneur may have innovated and introduced a new type of car that people like better.
Similarly, the heterogeneous nature of capital goods doesn't mean that interest rates cannot coordinate saving and investment. However, even if saving and investment are coordinated, there is no guarantee that the particular capital goods being produced will help produce the products that people are most willing to buy. Because of creative destruction, it is likely that there will nearly always be "malinvestment." Capital goods will be produced that in retrospect should not have been produced. Instead, the resources would have been better used to produce something else.
Ritenour then states:
Exactly, the first portion is exactly what aggregate demand is about. It refers to a situation where the quantity of money or the demand to hold money shifts resulting in either a surplus of money or a shortage of money.
A surplus of money is matched by a shortage of goods and services, and that is what it means for aggregate demand to exceed aggregate supply. A shortage of money is matched by a surplus of goods and services, and that it what it means for aggregate demand to be less than aggregate supply. And finally, if the quantity of money is equal to the demand to hold money, there is no shortage or surplus of output. Aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply.
How does this relate to a "single" price level? If the prices of both final goods and resources adjust, then the real quantity of money will adjust to match the demand, closing off any surplus or shortage of money. The primary problem with Hutt's account is the assumption that the problem is necessarily the price of the resource in surplus and that it is the fault of obstinate labor unions preventing the adjustment.
While unions certainly could cause problems, if output prices fail to fall in the face of an excess demand for money, no amount of wage cutting will help reduce unemployment. The problem isn't with the relative price of some resource, the real wage in this instance, but rather with the price level and the real quantity of money. Further, there have been many historical instances where unions are unimportant, weak, or even nonexistent, and reductions in spending on output have resulted in extensive reductions in both output and employment.
Market Monetarists (and nearly all mainstream economists these days,) recognize that decreases in prices and wages increase real money balances and expand aggregate demand and that this can bring the real volume of sales into balance with the productive capacity of the economy.
Something like this is behind what is called the "natural rate hypothesis." In the long run, aggregate supply is vertical at the level of output that depends on the ability and willingness to produce goods and services. Aggregate demand solely influences the price level, including the prices of productive resources like labor.
Market Monetarists insist that expanding the nominal quantity of money is a much better way to raise the real quantity of money and bring it into balance with the real demand to hold money, simultaneously raising nominal and real aggregate demand so that it matches potential output.
By the way, Market Monetarists, like just about everyone else, recognizes that while an excess demand (shortage) of money is matched by an excess supply (surplus) of output, that output is heterogeneous. Each and every type of output has its own supply and demand, and the difference between each supply and demand, evaluated at the current market price, must be summed to find the net excess demand or supply of output.
If aggregate demand equals potential output, then the sum of the excess demands for all types of output is zero. This implies that there can very well be surpluses of some goods or services, but that these surpluses are matched by shortages of other types of goods and services.
In other words, it is almost exactly like what a naive interpretation of Say's Law claims must be true at all times. Supposedly, supply creates its own demand, and so while there may be a surplus, or glut, of some goods, this is because resources have been used to produce the wrong goods or services. The markets for the goods that were not produced because of the misallocation of resources are in shortage.
That prices fall in markets with surpluses and rise in markets with shortages is exactly how market signals are created to shift resources to produce the most highly valued goods. In my view, in a world of creative destruction, this is happening all the time. The market order is a system of constant mutual adjustment to constant change.
Ritenour continues:
Actually, Market Monetarists favor having monetary authorities adjust the quantity of money either up or down to keep it equal to the demand to hold money. I find it odd that so many Austrians have this blind spot. It is always a critique of "inflation" (an increase in the quantity of money,) rather than considering the opposite situation where a reduction in money demand leads to a surplus of money, a shortage of output, and so a higher price level to reduce the real quantity of money and lower real aggregate demand to match potential output. Market Monetarists favor a reduction in the quantity of money in this situation.
The notion that an expansion in the quantity of money cannot accommodate an added demand to hold money because it fails to reach the specific individuals who want to hold more money is absurd. It ignores the fundamental proposition of monetary theory.
The individuals who want to hold more money actually do obtain it by spending less out of their current incomes or selling some asset they own. Of course, those from whom they would have purchased the goods or those to whom they sold the assets now have less money. As those people in turn restrict expenditures or sell assets, they rebuild their money holdings but the shortage shifts to still others.
The fundamental proposition of monetary theory is that the individual can adjust his or her actual money holdings to desired money holdings easily. It is rather that if the total quantity of money is fixed, then the market as a whole must adjust its desired money holdings to the existing quantity. For this adjustment to be consistent with economy-wide coordination, what must change is the price level, both of output and productive resources including labor.
If the quantity of money changes to match the increase in the demand to hold money, then those choosing to accumulate money holdings do so, but the effect is identical to what would have happened if they had chosen to purchase whatever is purchased with the newly- issued money. For example, if people choose to reduce expenditures out of current income and accumulate funds in their checking accounts, and banks create new money and make loans to various businesses, then the effect is the same as if those accumulating the money had instead made those loans directly to those businesses. Those accumulating money spend less on some goods, and the businesses spend more on other goods. There is no change in nominal GDP.
There is a reallocation of resources. But there would have been a reallocation of resources anyway. What an adjustment in the quantity of money allows is for this reallocation to occur without everyone in the market having to adjust their money prices (including wages) to increase the real quantity of money to match the demand. With an increase in the nominal quantity of money, those who need to expand production get a signal of increased nominal and real demand. Those who need to contract get a signal of reduced nominal and real demand.
This is as opposed to everyone getting a signal of reduced nominal demand, which is nearly always taken as a signal of reduced real demand and so creates the mistaken response of all firms cutting production. Only when the resulting surpluses of resources result in lower resource prices is the reality that all nominal opportunity costs have fallen (and real opportunity costs are the same) signalled to firms, so that they can expand both production and employment. The reallocation occurs anyway, with the signal to shift the allocation of resources arriving as some firms see falling costs turn their losses into profits sooner than others.
Anyway, since Market Monetarists favor a target growth path for NGDP, the notion that "there will need to be a significantly large increase in NGDP to maintain equilibrium," is beside the point. All that Market Monetarists propose is that increases in the demand for money be accommodated by increases in the nominal quantity of money so that they require no change in NGDP. We are not proposing to raise NGDP so that...I don't know what. No one ever adjusts their expenditure because they are short on money? I am not sure that would be possible.
As is so common, there is an implicit assumption that Market Monetarists are proposing to target real GDP or unemployment. Or perhaps more realistically, old arguments against targeting real GDP or unemployment are being trotted out where they don't apply. Market Monetarists are not proposing to increase nominal GDP whatever amount is necessary to close the output gap (raise real output to potential output) or lower the unemployment rate to the natural unemployment rate.
Retinour makes the following claim:
I am not sure how much of this is all due to Salerno or even if Ritenour correctly expresses Salerno's views. (I haven't read Salerno 2006.) But the way Ritenour describes it, Salerno is promoting an absurdly Walrasian account of the economy. First the equilibrium prices are determined, then everyone makes exchanges. I take a more "market process" view of the market economic order.
On the other hand, I don't think people choose to spend a certain amount of money on some particular good independent of the price and quantity combination it represents. From a micro perspective, the focus on spending comes from the budget constraint, keeping in mind that choosing to accumulate more money is a use of money income as well.
In later posts I will comment on Ritenour's criticisms of the Market Monetarist view of expectations and the actual consequences of changes in the money supply necessary to keep NGDP growing at a slow steady rate.
Market monetarist theory and policy is unsatisfactory primarily because Market monetarists use a faulty theoretical framework in analyzing economic activity, they misunderstand how expectations enter into economic decision making, and they do not recognize the actual consequences of the monetary policy necessary to stabilize NGDP expectations.
Is there any truth to these claims? What about our "faulty theoretical framework?" He writes:
Most relevant and troublesome for evaluating NGDP targeting is that there is no such thing as aggregate demand that equates with aggregate supply at a single price level.
In fact, the social economy is made up of a vast network of distinct markets that are integrated into a complex division of labor through the inter-temporal production structure and the use of a general medium of exchange. Productive activity, therefore, is the result of a vast number of decentralized decisions made by a multitude of different entrepreneurs at different places in the production structure.
Well, I certainly have no particular dispute with his broad description of the market economy. I would add a bit more emphasis on creative destruction--innovation by entrepreneurs introducing new goods and services and new methods of producing existing goods and services.
So far, there is only one major difference. In my view, there is something in a market economy that is usefully framed as "aggregate demand." And further, it can equal "aggregate supply" at a single "price level." However, this framing of aggregate demand and supply is fully consistent with an understanding that a market order is a vast network of distinct markets. (I might add, interrelated markets.)
He goes on to discuss capital:
Capital is not a blob of homogenous schmoo (Foss and Klein 2012, pp. 105-30), so investment is not a homogenous ‘I’ (Garrison 2001).
I certainly don't think of capital as "homogenous schmoo," and would even grant that investment is not a homogenous "I." Of course, the nominal volume of spending on newly produced capital goods is an actual flow of money expenditure. It is a sum of the amount spent on a variety of different things.
But then, literally identical drill press machines can be used for a variety of purposes--continuing to produce some variety of automobile that no one is going to want or else producing washing machines in an insufficient quantity to meet an unanticipated demand.
That doesn't make the role of the price of drill press machines in coordinating their supply and demand irrelevant. Still, even if the price of drill press machines does coordinate the supply and demand for drill press machines, there is no guarantee that people will want to purchase all of the cars that some of the drill press machines were used to produce. For example, some other entrepreneur may have innovated and introduced a new type of car that people like better.
Similarly, the heterogeneous nature of capital goods doesn't mean that interest rates cannot coordinate saving and investment. However, even if saving and investment are coordinated, there is no guarantee that the particular capital goods being produced will help produce the products that people are most willing to buy. Because of creative destruction, it is likely that there will nearly always be "malinvestment." Capital goods will be produced that in retrospect should not have been produced. Instead, the resources would have been better used to produce something else.
Ritenour then states:
It is possible for people to decrease their demand for consumer and producer goods if they increase their demand to hold money. This would only lead to wastefully idle resources, however, if prices for these resources remained above market-clearing levels. This will not persist, of course, if prices are allowed to adjust (Hutt 1979, pp. 138-39).
Exactly, the first portion is exactly what aggregate demand is about. It refers to a situation where the quantity of money or the demand to hold money shifts resulting in either a surplus of money or a shortage of money.
A surplus of money is matched by a shortage of goods and services, and that is what it means for aggregate demand to exceed aggregate supply. A shortage of money is matched by a surplus of goods and services, and that it what it means for aggregate demand to be less than aggregate supply. And finally, if the quantity of money is equal to the demand to hold money, there is no shortage or surplus of output. Aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply.
How does this relate to a "single" price level? If the prices of both final goods and resources adjust, then the real quantity of money will adjust to match the demand, closing off any surplus or shortage of money. The primary problem with Hutt's account is the assumption that the problem is necessarily the price of the resource in surplus and that it is the fault of obstinate labor unions preventing the adjustment.
While unions certainly could cause problems, if output prices fail to fall in the face of an excess demand for money, no amount of wage cutting will help reduce unemployment. The problem isn't with the relative price of some resource, the real wage in this instance, but rather with the price level and the real quantity of money. Further, there have been many historical instances where unions are unimportant, weak, or even nonexistent, and reductions in spending on output have resulted in extensive reductions in both output and employment.
Market Monetarists (and nearly all mainstream economists these days,) recognize that decreases in prices and wages increase real money balances and expand aggregate demand and that this can bring the real volume of sales into balance with the productive capacity of the economy.
Something like this is behind what is called the "natural rate hypothesis." In the long run, aggregate supply is vertical at the level of output that depends on the ability and willingness to produce goods and services. Aggregate demand solely influences the price level, including the prices of productive resources like labor.
Market Monetarists insist that expanding the nominal quantity of money is a much better way to raise the real quantity of money and bring it into balance with the real demand to hold money, simultaneously raising nominal and real aggregate demand so that it matches potential output.
By the way, Market Monetarists, like just about everyone else, recognizes that while an excess demand (shortage) of money is matched by an excess supply (surplus) of output, that output is heterogeneous. Each and every type of output has its own supply and demand, and the difference between each supply and demand, evaluated at the current market price, must be summed to find the net excess demand or supply of output.
If aggregate demand equals potential output, then the sum of the excess demands for all types of output is zero. This implies that there can very well be surpluses of some goods or services, but that these surpluses are matched by shortages of other types of goods and services.
In other words, it is almost exactly like what a naive interpretation of Say's Law claims must be true at all times. Supposedly, supply creates its own demand, and so while there may be a surplus, or glut, of some goods, this is because resources have been used to produce the wrong goods or services. The markets for the goods that were not produced because of the misallocation of resources are in shortage.
That prices fall in markets with surpluses and rise in markets with shortages is exactly how market signals are created to shift resources to produce the most highly valued goods. In my view, in a world of creative destruction, this is happening all the time. The market order is a system of constant mutual adjustment to constant change.
Ritenour continues:
Instead of allowing markets to clear via price adjustments according to subjective preferences, market monetarists advocate that monetary authorities bring about market stability by increasing the money supply. Such inflation, however, will not necessarily equilibrate the specific demand for and supply of money on the part of the individuals who are experiencing the excess demand. If prices and wages are that sticky, there will need to be a significantly large increase in NGDP to maintain equilibrium.
Actually, Market Monetarists favor having monetary authorities adjust the quantity of money either up or down to keep it equal to the demand to hold money. I find it odd that so many Austrians have this blind spot. It is always a critique of "inflation" (an increase in the quantity of money,) rather than considering the opposite situation where a reduction in money demand leads to a surplus of money, a shortage of output, and so a higher price level to reduce the real quantity of money and lower real aggregate demand to match potential output. Market Monetarists favor a reduction in the quantity of money in this situation.
The notion that an expansion in the quantity of money cannot accommodate an added demand to hold money because it fails to reach the specific individuals who want to hold more money is absurd. It ignores the fundamental proposition of monetary theory.
The individuals who want to hold more money actually do obtain it by spending less out of their current incomes or selling some asset they own. Of course, those from whom they would have purchased the goods or those to whom they sold the assets now have less money. As those people in turn restrict expenditures or sell assets, they rebuild their money holdings but the shortage shifts to still others.
The fundamental proposition of monetary theory is that the individual can adjust his or her actual money holdings to desired money holdings easily. It is rather that if the total quantity of money is fixed, then the market as a whole must adjust its desired money holdings to the existing quantity. For this adjustment to be consistent with economy-wide coordination, what must change is the price level, both of output and productive resources including labor.
If the quantity of money changes to match the increase in the demand to hold money, then those choosing to accumulate money holdings do so, but the effect is identical to what would have happened if they had chosen to purchase whatever is purchased with the newly- issued money. For example, if people choose to reduce expenditures out of current income and accumulate funds in their checking accounts, and banks create new money and make loans to various businesses, then the effect is the same as if those accumulating the money had instead made those loans directly to those businesses. Those accumulating money spend less on some goods, and the businesses spend more on other goods. There is no change in nominal GDP.
There is a reallocation of resources. But there would have been a reallocation of resources anyway. What an adjustment in the quantity of money allows is for this reallocation to occur without everyone in the market having to adjust their money prices (including wages) to increase the real quantity of money to match the demand. With an increase in the nominal quantity of money, those who need to expand production get a signal of increased nominal and real demand. Those who need to contract get a signal of reduced nominal and real demand.
This is as opposed to everyone getting a signal of reduced nominal demand, which is nearly always taken as a signal of reduced real demand and so creates the mistaken response of all firms cutting production. Only when the resulting surpluses of resources result in lower resource prices is the reality that all nominal opportunity costs have fallen (and real opportunity costs are the same) signalled to firms, so that they can expand both production and employment. The reallocation occurs anyway, with the signal to shift the allocation of resources arriving as some firms see falling costs turn their losses into profits sooner than others.
Anyway, since Market Monetarists favor a target growth path for NGDP, the notion that "there will need to be a significantly large increase in NGDP to maintain equilibrium," is beside the point. All that Market Monetarists propose is that increases in the demand for money be accommodated by increases in the nominal quantity of money so that they require no change in NGDP. We are not proposing to raise NGDP so that...I don't know what. No one ever adjusts their expenditure because they are short on money? I am not sure that would be possible.
As is so common, there is an implicit assumption that Market Monetarists are proposing to target real GDP or unemployment. Or perhaps more realistically, old arguments against targeting real GDP or unemployment are being trotted out where they don't apply. Market Monetarists are not proposing to increase nominal GDP whatever amount is necessary to close the output gap (raise real output to potential output) or lower the unemployment rate to the natural unemployment rate.
Retinour makes the following claim:
Additionally, decreases in demand are always experienced in particular markets. When there is either a decrease in demand or a decrease in supply in the face of elastic demand, total expenditures will drop. Note however, that spending is the effect of the changes in the preferences of buyers and sellers, not the cause of the decrease in demand or supply. Salerno (2006) shows how this applies to the broad social economy. Market-clearing prices (and quantities) are determined on every market by the interaction of individuals’ value scales on which goods are valued in relation to one another and to money. It is only after market equilibrium prices and quantities and, therefore, the value of money, have already been determined that “spending”occurs.
I am not sure how much of this is all due to Salerno or even if Ritenour correctly expresses Salerno's views. (I haven't read Salerno 2006.) But the way Ritenour describes it, Salerno is promoting an absurdly Walrasian account of the economy. First the equilibrium prices are determined, then everyone makes exchanges. I take a more "market process" view of the market economic order.
On the other hand, I don't think people choose to spend a certain amount of money on some particular good independent of the price and quantity combination it represents. From a micro perspective, the focus on spending comes from the budget constraint, keeping in mind that choosing to accumulate more money is a use of money income as well.
In later posts I will comment on Ritenour's criticisms of the Market Monetarist view of expectations and the actual consequences of changes in the money supply necessary to keep NGDP growing at a slow steady rate.
Saturday, April 20, 2013
An Evolution of Index Futures Convertibility
Scott Sumner is the leading advocate of index futures targeting. I favor a very similar proposal, index futures convertibility. Both are really sets of proposals, and over time, there has been substantial convergence.
I have used the term "index futures convertibility" to refer to Sumner's proposals. To some degree, it is a matter of framing rather than substantive difference. My interest in this approach developed from something Leland Yeager mentioned in correspondence. We were discussing issues with "indirect convertibility." (Update: Kevin Dowd has made key contributions to the literature on futures targeting and I believe that his thinking on the matter developed in a way very similar to mine--modifications of indirect convertibility.)
Consider a gold standard. Paper money is redeemable with gold. Gold can be deposited in exchange for paper money. Add a central bank and a slightly different framing, and the central bank is obligated to buy and sell gold at a fixed price.
Of course, it is possible to make money out of gold--full bodied gold coins. It is possible that gold can be exchanged by weight. With a well-developed gold standard, some interbank settlements can be made with gold bars. And, of course, there is a long history of encouraging central (or commercial) banks to hold ample gold reserves. On the other hand, it is possible that no one would be interested in using gold coins and there are alternatives to settling payments by transferring gold bars.
Further, only minimal gold reserves are necessary for a gold standard. The obligation of a central bank to buy and sell gold at a fixed price requires it to adjust the quantity of money, most probably by open market operations with government bonds or other securities, so that the equilibrium price level results in a relative price of gold that clears the gold market. If an excess demand for gold develops at the official price, then the central bank must "tighten" monetary policy. If an excess supply of gold develops at the official price, the central bank must "loosen" monetary policy.
Why require the central bank to actually buy and sell gold? It is a simple rule that constrains the central bank to make the needed changes in monetary policy to keep the price of gold at its "official" level. The macroeconomic consequence of the regime is that the equilibrium price level depends on the relative price of gold, which in turn depends on the supply and demand for gold. Shifts in that equilibrium price level will be associated with shifts in spending on output, but in the long run, nominal GDP will equal potential output times the equilibrium price level.
Now, consider a multiple standard. In place of gold, paper money is redeemable with a bundle of commodities. It could be a fixed amount of gold plus a fixed amount of silver plus a fixed amount of copper plus a fixed amount of steel plus a fixed amount of aluminum. A more inclusive bundle is possible as well. A bushel of wheat plus a bushel of corn, plus a bushel of rice could be added.
With a multiple standard, commodity coins are either highly impractical or literally impossible. Settlement of payments with bundles of commodities is difficult and costly. Similarly, holding reserves made up of all of the various items in the bundle would be costly for central (or private) banks.
Some advocates of a multiple standard see holding large commodity reserves as a virtue. However, consider the opposite extreme where reserves are minimal to nonexistent. The central bank would be compelled to adjust monetary policy, presumably by buying or selling government bonds or other securities, such that the sum of the market prices of the items in the bundle totals to the "official" price. If the net supply and demand conditions for the various items results in upward pressure on the price of the bundle, the central bank must tighten monetary policy. If instead there is downward pressure on the total of the prices of the bundle items, then the central bank must loosen monetary policy.
What is the point of requiring the central bank to buy and sell the bundles? It is a simple rule that compels the central bank to adjust its monetary policy so that the total price of the bundle remains fixed at the "official" price. The macroeconomics of the regime would be that the price level would depend on the relative price of the bundle. If relative prices of the items in the bundle are subject to independent variation, the more inclusive the bundle, the more stable the relative price of the bundle. Of course, as the bundle approaches the makeup of output, then the price level becomes closer to depending on the price of the bundle relative to itself, which is fixed by definition.
How is it possible to overcome the cost of storing these commodities? Extending the items included in the bundle is desirable, but there is a trade off with cost of storage. Further, a substantial portion of output is made up of goods and services that cannot be stored at all. How can they be included?
Indirect convertibility requires that the issuer of money, such as a central bank, buy and sell some "redemption medium" that has a current market value equal to the sum of the market prices of the items in the bundle of goods that serves as medium of account. I tend to favor some kind of security, such as T-bills, but it is possible to explain the system using gold as a redemption medium.
Using gold as redemption medium, the central bank would buy and sell gold that has a market value equal to the sum of the actual market prices of the items making up the bundle of goods and services that defines the dollar. As before, what the central bank would actually do is use open market operations in government bonds or other securities to tighten monetary policy when the total price of the items in the bundle would otherwise tend to rise above its official price and loosen monetary policy when the total price of the items in the bundle would otherwise tend to fall below its official price.
Why require indirect convertibility? It is a simple (well, maybe not so simple) rule that compels the central bank to make the appropriate changes in monetary policy. Indirect convertibility is a substitute for direct convertibility.
How does indirect convertibility impose this constraint? If the total of the market prices of the items in the bundle should actually deviate from target, the central bank would be obligated to buy or sell the redemption medium, here gold, at a price different from the market price. Those trading with the central bank would make profit and the central bank would suffer financial losses. Because there would be transactions costs for those redeeming and selling or buying and depositing gold, this creates a range for variation in the total price of the bundle. To avoid ruinous financial losses, the central bank would be compelled to adjust monetary policy to keep the total price of the bundle within the range determined by transactions costs.
Indirect convertibility does not involve fixing the price of the redemption medium, gold in this example. The price of gold is free to adjust according to supply and demand conditions in the gold market. If the price of the bundle is on target, the central bank is obligated to buy and sell gold at the current market price, which is the same price that everyone receives on the market. There is no particular reason to for anyone to trade gold with the central bank. There would be nothing socially desirable about people buying or selling gold at the central bank.
Even if the price of the bundle deviates from target, the market price of gold isn't fixed. The market price of gold can vary with the supply and demand for gold, though the central bank is providing arbitrage profits to those who trade gold with the central bank.
The market forces created by indirect convertibility are very powerful in terms of keeping the price of the bundle within a narrow range. However, shifts in the relative supply and demand conditions of the bundle, particularly a narrow bundle, would require very sharp shifts in monetary policy that would result in perhaps very damaging shifts in nominal expenditure on output and on the broader price level. These would be similar to supply shocks.
Unfortunately, expanding the bundle creates measurement problems. The analysis above assumes continuous measurement. If the total price of the bundle is measured only periodically, requiring the central bank to make redemptions based upon the last measurement until the subsequent measurement could be extremely disruptive. This is especially true with monthly (or quarterly) measurements, but weekly or even daily measurements would hardly help.
Yeager suggested that perhaps the answer is to redeem now with some of the redemption medium, and then use the subsequent measurement of the price of the bundle to determine the additional amount of the redemption medium that must be provided to complete the transaction. I took this idea and developed it such that the central banks (or private banks, really) buy and sell the redemption media at its current market price and then after the subsequent measurement of the actual market prices of the bundel items, the amount transacted would be adjusted according to any deviation of the total market price of the bundle from the target price.
The "adjustment" is equivalent to a futures contract. If the total of the prices of items in the bundle is divided by the target price for the bundle, the result is an index number. The goal is for the central bank to adjust monetary policy to keep the price index at 100. Indirect convertibility using the subsequent measurement of the price index involves the central bank buying and selling the redemption medium at its market price along with a futures contract on the price index. If the price index is above target, the central bank must pay those who purchased the redemption medium and a the futures contract. If the price index is below target, the central bank must pay those who sold the redemption medium and a futures contract.
If those buying and selling the futures match, the central bank buys and sells equal amounts of the redemption medium and is hedged on the future contract. If the price index comes in above or below target, the central bank subsequently transfers funds between those who bought redemption medium and those who sold it.
If, on the other hand, there is an expectation that the price index will be above 100, then there is an incentive to redeem money for gold (buy gold) in order to obtain a futures contract from the central bank. If the price index does come in above target, the central bank would owe money to all of those who redeemed money. The central bank would be given a financial incentive to avoid that consequence by tightening monetary policy before the price level rose, keeping it on target at 100.
If there is an expectation that the price index will be below 100, then there is an incentive to sell gold to the central bank in order to sell the futures contract. If the price index does come in below 100, then the central bank would owe money to all of those from whom it purchased the gold. To avoid those losses, the central bank would need to implement an expansionary monetary policy.
The central bank would have a financial incentive to always adjust monetary policy to keep the price index on target. If the change in the price index was a bolt from the blue, and no one expected it, then there would be no incentive to buy or sell gold and buy or sell a futures contract on the index. There would be no financial consequences for the central bank.
If the deviation of the price index from 100 is so small that the payments are too small to cover transactions costs, then there is no incentive to trade the futures contract. The incentives only come into play with significant and expected shifts in the price index. The central bank is compelled by the threat of financial losses to tighten or loosen monetary policy to avoid any significant expected deviation of the price index from target.
Sumner pointed out that very next measurement of the price index would be inappropriate. That is because the redemptions would be occurring after some the prices used to calculate the index have already been measured. This argument suggests that purchases and sales of the redemption medium in April should be adjusted according to any deviation of the price index from 100 in May. This would be reported in early June.
Since the actual point of the regime is to impose financial losses on the central bank for significant anticipated deviations of the price index from target, there is no reason to actually require that some redemption medium be purchased or sold. The financial losses are solely from the futures contracts and it is to avoid those losses that the central bank uses ordinary open market operations to keep the expected value of the price index on target. Trading gold or some other redemption medium is just an unnecessary third wheel.
Exactly which future measure of the price index should be used is not obvious. Why not have the central bank buy and sell futures this month on the price index two or three months in the future rather than one month?
And finally, the futures contracts don't have to be on a price index. It is possible to use some other nominal macroeconomic magnitude--for example, an index calculated by deviations of nominal GDP from a target growth path.
The rationale for the system is to impose a financial penalty on a central bank that fails to adjust its monetary policy enough to avoid a significant expected deviation of the value of some policy goal from target. Those of us who believe that a nominal GDP level target is the best (or least bad) target, would propose that the penalty be for failing to adjust monetary policy to avoid a significant expected deviation of nominal GDP from its target growth path.
In my view, that is the purpose of index futures convertibility. It is a substitute for direct convertibility of money with a single easily storable commodity like gold or silver. Its benefit is that it constrains the central bank (or a private banking system if that can be managed) to stabilize expected spending on output rather than the price of gold. It is better to stabilize the growth path of spending on output rather than some measure of the price level. And it is better to stabilize the growth path of spending on output rather than have it fluctuate with the supply and demand conditions for gold.
Index futures convertibility necessarily has little connection with existing futures contracts which involve a changing price of the futures contract to reflect expectations of a changing price of the underlying commodity at the settlement date. Further, it has little connection to the typical futures contract which involves a storable commodity (or financial asset) and so allows hedging. The logic where futures prices drive spot prices by hedging and storage just does not apply.
The notion that there will be a futures contract on some macroeconomic statistic that the central bank is trying to stabilize, and the central bank will watch the price of that futures contract and vary its policy instrument settings to stabilize it, and particularly according to some mechanical rule, is fraught with difficulties. But I have never conceived of index futures convertibility as being anything like that.
I have used the term "index futures convertibility" to refer to Sumner's proposals. To some degree, it is a matter of framing rather than substantive difference. My interest in this approach developed from something Leland Yeager mentioned in correspondence. We were discussing issues with "indirect convertibility." (Update: Kevin Dowd has made key contributions to the literature on futures targeting and I believe that his thinking on the matter developed in a way very similar to mine--modifications of indirect convertibility.)
Consider a gold standard. Paper money is redeemable with gold. Gold can be deposited in exchange for paper money. Add a central bank and a slightly different framing, and the central bank is obligated to buy and sell gold at a fixed price.
Of course, it is possible to make money out of gold--full bodied gold coins. It is possible that gold can be exchanged by weight. With a well-developed gold standard, some interbank settlements can be made with gold bars. And, of course, there is a long history of encouraging central (or commercial) banks to hold ample gold reserves. On the other hand, it is possible that no one would be interested in using gold coins and there are alternatives to settling payments by transferring gold bars.
Further, only minimal gold reserves are necessary for a gold standard. The obligation of a central bank to buy and sell gold at a fixed price requires it to adjust the quantity of money, most probably by open market operations with government bonds or other securities, so that the equilibrium price level results in a relative price of gold that clears the gold market. If an excess demand for gold develops at the official price, then the central bank must "tighten" monetary policy. If an excess supply of gold develops at the official price, the central bank must "loosen" monetary policy.
Why require the central bank to actually buy and sell gold? It is a simple rule that constrains the central bank to make the needed changes in monetary policy to keep the price of gold at its "official" level. The macroeconomic consequence of the regime is that the equilibrium price level depends on the relative price of gold, which in turn depends on the supply and demand for gold. Shifts in that equilibrium price level will be associated with shifts in spending on output, but in the long run, nominal GDP will equal potential output times the equilibrium price level.
Now, consider a multiple standard. In place of gold, paper money is redeemable with a bundle of commodities. It could be a fixed amount of gold plus a fixed amount of silver plus a fixed amount of copper plus a fixed amount of steel plus a fixed amount of aluminum. A more inclusive bundle is possible as well. A bushel of wheat plus a bushel of corn, plus a bushel of rice could be added.
With a multiple standard, commodity coins are either highly impractical or literally impossible. Settlement of payments with bundles of commodities is difficult and costly. Similarly, holding reserves made up of all of the various items in the bundle would be costly for central (or private) banks.
Some advocates of a multiple standard see holding large commodity reserves as a virtue. However, consider the opposite extreme where reserves are minimal to nonexistent. The central bank would be compelled to adjust monetary policy, presumably by buying or selling government bonds or other securities, such that the sum of the market prices of the items in the bundle totals to the "official" price. If the net supply and demand conditions for the various items results in upward pressure on the price of the bundle, the central bank must tighten monetary policy. If instead there is downward pressure on the total of the prices of the bundle items, then the central bank must loosen monetary policy.
What is the point of requiring the central bank to buy and sell the bundles? It is a simple rule that compels the central bank to adjust its monetary policy so that the total price of the bundle remains fixed at the "official" price. The macroeconomics of the regime would be that the price level would depend on the relative price of the bundle. If relative prices of the items in the bundle are subject to independent variation, the more inclusive the bundle, the more stable the relative price of the bundle. Of course, as the bundle approaches the makeup of output, then the price level becomes closer to depending on the price of the bundle relative to itself, which is fixed by definition.
How is it possible to overcome the cost of storing these commodities? Extending the items included in the bundle is desirable, but there is a trade off with cost of storage. Further, a substantial portion of output is made up of goods and services that cannot be stored at all. How can they be included?
Indirect convertibility requires that the issuer of money, such as a central bank, buy and sell some "redemption medium" that has a current market value equal to the sum of the market prices of the items in the bundle of goods that serves as medium of account. I tend to favor some kind of security, such as T-bills, but it is possible to explain the system using gold as a redemption medium.
Using gold as redemption medium, the central bank would buy and sell gold that has a market value equal to the sum of the actual market prices of the items making up the bundle of goods and services that defines the dollar. As before, what the central bank would actually do is use open market operations in government bonds or other securities to tighten monetary policy when the total price of the items in the bundle would otherwise tend to rise above its official price and loosen monetary policy when the total price of the items in the bundle would otherwise tend to fall below its official price.
Why require indirect convertibility? It is a simple (well, maybe not so simple) rule that compels the central bank to make the appropriate changes in monetary policy. Indirect convertibility is a substitute for direct convertibility.
How does indirect convertibility impose this constraint? If the total of the market prices of the items in the bundle should actually deviate from target, the central bank would be obligated to buy or sell the redemption medium, here gold, at a price different from the market price. Those trading with the central bank would make profit and the central bank would suffer financial losses. Because there would be transactions costs for those redeeming and selling or buying and depositing gold, this creates a range for variation in the total price of the bundle. To avoid ruinous financial losses, the central bank would be compelled to adjust monetary policy to keep the total price of the bundle within the range determined by transactions costs.
Indirect convertibility does not involve fixing the price of the redemption medium, gold in this example. The price of gold is free to adjust according to supply and demand conditions in the gold market. If the price of the bundle is on target, the central bank is obligated to buy and sell gold at the current market price, which is the same price that everyone receives on the market. There is no particular reason to for anyone to trade gold with the central bank. There would be nothing socially desirable about people buying or selling gold at the central bank.
Even if the price of the bundle deviates from target, the market price of gold isn't fixed. The market price of gold can vary with the supply and demand for gold, though the central bank is providing arbitrage profits to those who trade gold with the central bank.
The market forces created by indirect convertibility are very powerful in terms of keeping the price of the bundle within a narrow range. However, shifts in the relative supply and demand conditions of the bundle, particularly a narrow bundle, would require very sharp shifts in monetary policy that would result in perhaps very damaging shifts in nominal expenditure on output and on the broader price level. These would be similar to supply shocks.
Unfortunately, expanding the bundle creates measurement problems. The analysis above assumes continuous measurement. If the total price of the bundle is measured only periodically, requiring the central bank to make redemptions based upon the last measurement until the subsequent measurement could be extremely disruptive. This is especially true with monthly (or quarterly) measurements, but weekly or even daily measurements would hardly help.
Yeager suggested that perhaps the answer is to redeem now with some of the redemption medium, and then use the subsequent measurement of the price of the bundle to determine the additional amount of the redemption medium that must be provided to complete the transaction. I took this idea and developed it such that the central banks (or private banks, really) buy and sell the redemption media at its current market price and then after the subsequent measurement of the actual market prices of the bundel items, the amount transacted would be adjusted according to any deviation of the total market price of the bundle from the target price.
The "adjustment" is equivalent to a futures contract. If the total of the prices of items in the bundle is divided by the target price for the bundle, the result is an index number. The goal is for the central bank to adjust monetary policy to keep the price index at 100. Indirect convertibility using the subsequent measurement of the price index involves the central bank buying and selling the redemption medium at its market price along with a futures contract on the price index. If the price index is above target, the central bank must pay those who purchased the redemption medium and a the futures contract. If the price index is below target, the central bank must pay those who sold the redemption medium and a futures contract.
If those buying and selling the futures match, the central bank buys and sells equal amounts of the redemption medium and is hedged on the future contract. If the price index comes in above or below target, the central bank subsequently transfers funds between those who bought redemption medium and those who sold it.
If, on the other hand, there is an expectation that the price index will be above 100, then there is an incentive to redeem money for gold (buy gold) in order to obtain a futures contract from the central bank. If the price index does come in above target, the central bank would owe money to all of those who redeemed money. The central bank would be given a financial incentive to avoid that consequence by tightening monetary policy before the price level rose, keeping it on target at 100.
If there is an expectation that the price index will be below 100, then there is an incentive to sell gold to the central bank in order to sell the futures contract. If the price index does come in below 100, then the central bank would owe money to all of those from whom it purchased the gold. To avoid those losses, the central bank would need to implement an expansionary monetary policy.
The central bank would have a financial incentive to always adjust monetary policy to keep the price index on target. If the change in the price index was a bolt from the blue, and no one expected it, then there would be no incentive to buy or sell gold and buy or sell a futures contract on the index. There would be no financial consequences for the central bank.
If the deviation of the price index from 100 is so small that the payments are too small to cover transactions costs, then there is no incentive to trade the futures contract. The incentives only come into play with significant and expected shifts in the price index. The central bank is compelled by the threat of financial losses to tighten or loosen monetary policy to avoid any significant expected deviation of the price index from target.
Sumner pointed out that very next measurement of the price index would be inappropriate. That is because the redemptions would be occurring after some the prices used to calculate the index have already been measured. This argument suggests that purchases and sales of the redemption medium in April should be adjusted according to any deviation of the price index from 100 in May. This would be reported in early June.
Since the actual point of the regime is to impose financial losses on the central bank for significant anticipated deviations of the price index from target, there is no reason to actually require that some redemption medium be purchased or sold. The financial losses are solely from the futures contracts and it is to avoid those losses that the central bank uses ordinary open market operations to keep the expected value of the price index on target. Trading gold or some other redemption medium is just an unnecessary third wheel.
Exactly which future measure of the price index should be used is not obvious. Why not have the central bank buy and sell futures this month on the price index two or three months in the future rather than one month?
And finally, the futures contracts don't have to be on a price index. It is possible to use some other nominal macroeconomic magnitude--for example, an index calculated by deviations of nominal GDP from a target growth path.
The rationale for the system is to impose a financial penalty on a central bank that fails to adjust its monetary policy enough to avoid a significant expected deviation of the value of some policy goal from target. Those of us who believe that a nominal GDP level target is the best (or least bad) target, would propose that the penalty be for failing to adjust monetary policy to avoid a significant expected deviation of nominal GDP from its target growth path.
In my view, that is the purpose of index futures convertibility. It is a substitute for direct convertibility of money with a single easily storable commodity like gold or silver. Its benefit is that it constrains the central bank (or a private banking system if that can be managed) to stabilize expected spending on output rather than the price of gold. It is better to stabilize the growth path of spending on output rather than some measure of the price level. And it is better to stabilize the growth path of spending on output rather than have it fluctuate with the supply and demand conditions for gold.
Index futures convertibility necessarily has little connection with existing futures contracts which involve a changing price of the futures contract to reflect expectations of a changing price of the underlying commodity at the settlement date. Further, it has little connection to the typical futures contract which involves a storable commodity (or financial asset) and so allows hedging. The logic where futures prices drive spot prices by hedging and storage just does not apply.
The notion that there will be a futures contract on some macroeconomic statistic that the central bank is trying to stabilize, and the central bank will watch the price of that futures contract and vary its policy instrument settings to stabilize it, and particularly according to some mechanical rule, is fraught with difficulties. But I have never conceived of index futures convertibility as being anything like that.
Thursday, April 18, 2013
Index Futures Targeting the Circularity Problem
Noah Smith discussed the "circularity problem" with using market expectations of inflation to control monetary policy and Scott Sumner replied. There has been some discussion of index futures targeting on the Money Illusion, Sumner's blog.
The circularity problem is related to Goodhart's law. If the Federal Reserve were to begin targeting an index futures contract on nominal GDP, then those trading the futures contract would buy or sell depending on what they expect the Federal Reserve to do. The price of the index futures contract would stay at the Fed's target.
This becomes a problem if the proposed system is a mechanical rule tying open market operations or some other instrument of monetary policy to deviations of the price of the index future from target. The problem is that it may be necessary for the growth rate of base money (or the level of short term interest rates, if you prefer that framing) to change in order for nominal GDP to remain on target. But the "rule" is supposed to be that these instruments can only be changed if first the price of the index futures contract actually deviates from the target. But those actually trading the futures contract will know that the instruments of monetary policy will change until any deviation is reversed. Those who paid more than the target price for the contract will lose when the price falls again. Those selling the contracts for less than the target price will lose when the price rises again. They won't do that, and so if anyone bothers to trade these contracts at all, which is unlikely, the price remains on target always. But if the price remains on target always, then the instrument of monetary policy, whether base money or a policy interest rate, never changes. But that means that nominal GDP will likely deviate from the target.
Sumner's version of index futures targeting and index futures convertibility are a bit different, but can be subject to similar difficulties. The key difference is that the central bank doesn't watch a market price of a nominal GDP futures contract and then change its policy instrument according to changes in the price of the future, it rather buys and sells the future itself at the target price. That means there is no change in the market price of the future at all during the period it is being targeted. And so, there is never a change in the price of the future to communicate what the market thinks nominal GDP will actually be. The market signal that is generated is the central bank's own position on the contract, which only provides information about whether speculators on net believe that nominal GDP will be above or below target.
If there is a mechanical rule that requires that some instrument of monetary policy remain unchanged until speculators actually buy or sell the contract, then the problem of circularity still develops but it is slightly different and weaker. For the instruments of monetary policy to change as needed, speculators must trade the future. Their incentive to trade the future is the expectation that nominal GDP will deviate from target. But when they trade the future, the central bank adjusts base money or its policy interest rate in a way that keeps nominal GDP on target. The speculators would expect no profit after all. But knowing that, the speculators would never trade the index futures contract, and so the instrument of monetary policy would never change. If base money (or short term interest rates) never change, then nominal GDP will deviate from target.
However, it is pretty clear that the actual result would be that if the current setting of the policy instrument (say the growth rate of base money,) is expected to leave nominal GDP on target, then no one will trade the future. Only if the current setting is so far off that the expected deviation is large enough to cover the transactions costs and risk of taking a position on the contract would it be traded. The trades would then lead to changes in the setting of monetary policy so to reduce the expected deviation and the expected profit. However, an expected deviation would remain that compensates those trading the future for transactions costs and risk. The market (and presumably the central bank,) would all know that the policy instruments are being set at a level that will keep nominal GDP away from target.
Due to this logic, Sumner began long ago to speak of subsidies for the market. For example, the central bank should not try to charge trading fees to cover its costs of operating the system. The central bank should not insist that speculators keep funds in margin accounts that only pay low (or no) interest. Sumner has instead proposed that the Fed should pay extra high interest on the accounts!
Interestingly, this entire analysis assumes homogeneous expectations by the market. It is as if "the market" is treated as if it is a single individual. And it is certainly possible that everyone would know and agree that nominal GDP will either be above or below the target. However, it is possible that there would be disagreement. Certainly, this reflects the real world where we have some economists who predict massive inflation and others who insist that recession and disinflation will persist. While it remains true that those who expect nominal GDP to come in very close to target would not trade, the setting of the actual policy instrument would result in a balance between those speculators who believe it will come in sufficiently far above target to provide them with a profit and those speculators who believe it will come in sufficiently below target to provide them with a profit. While the expectations of those who believe that nominal GDP will be close to target aren't counted, because they don't bother to trade, the balancing of those with more divergent expectations does imply that the "market" made up of the actual traders would expect nominal GDP to remain close to target.
Sumner's earlier versions of the proposal were much like this, but some years ago he instead proposed a modified system where the central bank can adjust base money as it sees fit, even without there being any trades of the contract. The central bank creates a tentative target for base money, and then adjusts that tentative target according to the trades of the speculators. This means there is never a problem about the instruments of monetary policy remaining fixed until there are trades of the contract. There is never any situation where everyone, including the central bank, knows that nominal GDP will deviate from target in some particular direction, but no one has an incentive to close the gap. Quite the contrary, if everyone, which would include the central bank, knows what must be done to adjust expected nominal GDP to target, then the central bank will do it. All that would be left is trades by speculators with divergent expectations.
If the central bank always adjusts its policy instrument so that it is hedged, then the reason to take a position on the contract is because of an expectation that some other speculator will disagree and be willing to take the opposing position. I lean towards a similar approach where the central bank is free to adjust its instruments of monetary policy as it sees fit subject to the constraint that it buy and sell the futures contract at the target price. This also avoids the "problem" of the instruments of monetary policy remaining stuck until there are trades of the contract. If no one trades the contract, then the central bank adjusts monetary policy as it sees fit. It is like the contracts don't exist. However, it is likely that those with highly divergent expectations would trade the contract.
While Sumner tends to favor some mechanical rule to require adjustments in some policy instrument when the future is traded, I am skeptical. Instead, I contrast a "conservative" central bank policy of seeking to hedge versus an "activist" policy of taking a position on the contract. The central bank's position on the contract would show its confidence in its own internal forecast relative to that of the market. Again, it is likely that there will nearly always be trades in both directions by people with highly divergent expectations. If market sentiment begins to move in one direction or another, the central bank will find itself with a large and growing position on the contract. Presumably it will also be aware of whatever it is that is moving the market and also take action to offset it . A conservative central bank would take action sufficient to hedge its position--so that those who think it did too much are exactly balanced by those who think it did too little. But keep in mind, that those who think it did almost the right thing, and only slightly too much or too little, wouldn't bother to trade. A more activist central bank would have more confidence that it did the right thing and that "the market" is wrong. It would hold a position on the contract, betting against "the market."
Is there still a "circularity" hiding in here? Yes, there is. Any trade of the future must take into account the possibility that the central bank will adjust its instruments of monetary policy to offset the trade. The reason to trade is an expectation that even after the adjustment by the central bank, nominal GDP will remain significantly away from target. The reason to trade is that the speculator believes that either the central bank or some other speculator will hold the opposite position.
Now, if we assume that the central bank will always fully hedge and that there is only one speculator, then what that means is that the central bank will adjust its instruments of monetary policy so that the single speculator reverses his position on the contract. If that is true, then there is no selfish motivation for the speculator to ever trade the future. If there were only one speculator, then no trades would ever occur. But, of course, since the central bank is free to adjust the instruments of monetary policy, the requirement that it trade the index futures contract would impose no constraint on the central bank. But that isn't the situation in the real world.
Finally, if the central bank were to decide that it "wants" to let nominal GDP deviate from target, and "the market" got wind of this desire, then it would suffer heavy financial losses. And that, of course, is really the point of the proposed reform. It will focus the central bank on the policy target and allow no "tradeoffs" with other things that central bankers may value. Or rather, there will be a large financial bill for any effort to satisfy their personal preferences.
The circularity problem is related to Goodhart's law. If the Federal Reserve were to begin targeting an index futures contract on nominal GDP, then those trading the futures contract would buy or sell depending on what they expect the Federal Reserve to do. The price of the index futures contract would stay at the Fed's target.
This becomes a problem if the proposed system is a mechanical rule tying open market operations or some other instrument of monetary policy to deviations of the price of the index future from target. The problem is that it may be necessary for the growth rate of base money (or the level of short term interest rates, if you prefer that framing) to change in order for nominal GDP to remain on target. But the "rule" is supposed to be that these instruments can only be changed if first the price of the index futures contract actually deviates from the target. But those actually trading the futures contract will know that the instruments of monetary policy will change until any deviation is reversed. Those who paid more than the target price for the contract will lose when the price falls again. Those selling the contracts for less than the target price will lose when the price rises again. They won't do that, and so if anyone bothers to trade these contracts at all, which is unlikely, the price remains on target always. But if the price remains on target always, then the instrument of monetary policy, whether base money or a policy interest rate, never changes. But that means that nominal GDP will likely deviate from the target.
Sumner's version of index futures targeting and index futures convertibility are a bit different, but can be subject to similar difficulties. The key difference is that the central bank doesn't watch a market price of a nominal GDP futures contract and then change its policy instrument according to changes in the price of the future, it rather buys and sells the future itself at the target price. That means there is no change in the market price of the future at all during the period it is being targeted. And so, there is never a change in the price of the future to communicate what the market thinks nominal GDP will actually be. The market signal that is generated is the central bank's own position on the contract, which only provides information about whether speculators on net believe that nominal GDP will be above or below target.
If there is a mechanical rule that requires that some instrument of monetary policy remain unchanged until speculators actually buy or sell the contract, then the problem of circularity still develops but it is slightly different and weaker. For the instruments of monetary policy to change as needed, speculators must trade the future. Their incentive to trade the future is the expectation that nominal GDP will deviate from target. But when they trade the future, the central bank adjusts base money or its policy interest rate in a way that keeps nominal GDP on target. The speculators would expect no profit after all. But knowing that, the speculators would never trade the index futures contract, and so the instrument of monetary policy would never change. If base money (or short term interest rates) never change, then nominal GDP will deviate from target.
However, it is pretty clear that the actual result would be that if the current setting of the policy instrument (say the growth rate of base money,) is expected to leave nominal GDP on target, then no one will trade the future. Only if the current setting is so far off that the expected deviation is large enough to cover the transactions costs and risk of taking a position on the contract would it be traded. The trades would then lead to changes in the setting of monetary policy so to reduce the expected deviation and the expected profit. However, an expected deviation would remain that compensates those trading the future for transactions costs and risk. The market (and presumably the central bank,) would all know that the policy instruments are being set at a level that will keep nominal GDP away from target.
Due to this logic, Sumner began long ago to speak of subsidies for the market. For example, the central bank should not try to charge trading fees to cover its costs of operating the system. The central bank should not insist that speculators keep funds in margin accounts that only pay low (or no) interest. Sumner has instead proposed that the Fed should pay extra high interest on the accounts!
Interestingly, this entire analysis assumes homogeneous expectations by the market. It is as if "the market" is treated as if it is a single individual. And it is certainly possible that everyone would know and agree that nominal GDP will either be above or below the target. However, it is possible that there would be disagreement. Certainly, this reflects the real world where we have some economists who predict massive inflation and others who insist that recession and disinflation will persist. While it remains true that those who expect nominal GDP to come in very close to target would not trade, the setting of the actual policy instrument would result in a balance between those speculators who believe it will come in sufficiently far above target to provide them with a profit and those speculators who believe it will come in sufficiently below target to provide them with a profit. While the expectations of those who believe that nominal GDP will be close to target aren't counted, because they don't bother to trade, the balancing of those with more divergent expectations does imply that the "market" made up of the actual traders would expect nominal GDP to remain close to target.
Sumner's earlier versions of the proposal were much like this, but some years ago he instead proposed a modified system where the central bank can adjust base money as it sees fit, even without there being any trades of the contract. The central bank creates a tentative target for base money, and then adjusts that tentative target according to the trades of the speculators. This means there is never a problem about the instruments of monetary policy remaining fixed until there are trades of the contract. There is never any situation where everyone, including the central bank, knows that nominal GDP will deviate from target in some particular direction, but no one has an incentive to close the gap. Quite the contrary, if everyone, which would include the central bank, knows what must be done to adjust expected nominal GDP to target, then the central bank will do it. All that would be left is trades by speculators with divergent expectations.
If the central bank always adjusts its policy instrument so that it is hedged, then the reason to take a position on the contract is because of an expectation that some other speculator will disagree and be willing to take the opposing position. I lean towards a similar approach where the central bank is free to adjust its instruments of monetary policy as it sees fit subject to the constraint that it buy and sell the futures contract at the target price. This also avoids the "problem" of the instruments of monetary policy remaining stuck until there are trades of the contract. If no one trades the contract, then the central bank adjusts monetary policy as it sees fit. It is like the contracts don't exist. However, it is likely that those with highly divergent expectations would trade the contract.
While Sumner tends to favor some mechanical rule to require adjustments in some policy instrument when the future is traded, I am skeptical. Instead, I contrast a "conservative" central bank policy of seeking to hedge versus an "activist" policy of taking a position on the contract. The central bank's position on the contract would show its confidence in its own internal forecast relative to that of the market. Again, it is likely that there will nearly always be trades in both directions by people with highly divergent expectations. If market sentiment begins to move in one direction or another, the central bank will find itself with a large and growing position on the contract. Presumably it will also be aware of whatever it is that is moving the market and also take action to offset it . A conservative central bank would take action sufficient to hedge its position--so that those who think it did too much are exactly balanced by those who think it did too little. But keep in mind, that those who think it did almost the right thing, and only slightly too much or too little, wouldn't bother to trade. A more activist central bank would have more confidence that it did the right thing and that "the market" is wrong. It would hold a position on the contract, betting against "the market."
Is there still a "circularity" hiding in here? Yes, there is. Any trade of the future must take into account the possibility that the central bank will adjust its instruments of monetary policy to offset the trade. The reason to trade is an expectation that even after the adjustment by the central bank, nominal GDP will remain significantly away from target. The reason to trade is that the speculator believes that either the central bank or some other speculator will hold the opposite position.
Now, if we assume that the central bank will always fully hedge and that there is only one speculator, then what that means is that the central bank will adjust its instruments of monetary policy so that the single speculator reverses his position on the contract. If that is true, then there is no selfish motivation for the speculator to ever trade the future. If there were only one speculator, then no trades would ever occur. But, of course, since the central bank is free to adjust the instruments of monetary policy, the requirement that it trade the index futures contract would impose no constraint on the central bank. But that isn't the situation in the real world.
Finally, if the central bank were to decide that it "wants" to let nominal GDP deviate from target, and "the market" got wind of this desire, then it would suffer heavy financial losses. And that, of course, is really the point of the proposed reform. It will focus the central bank on the policy target and allow no "tradeoffs" with other things that central bankers may value. Or rather, there will be a large financial bill for any effort to satisfy their personal preferences.
Sunday, April 14, 2013
Can the Fed Use Bitcoin Technology?
JP Koning has an interesting post where he argues that the Bitcoin approach of a distributed payments network is superior to a centralized network like Fedwire. His emphasis is on the possibility of the physical destruction of the Fed's central node (and its two backups.) I would be interested in resiliancy regarding unraveling of trades.
Koning explains that the Bitcoin "mining" involves supporting and verifying the network. (It isn't just make work.) While I will grant that this is valuable work, I don't favor a monetary base that only increases or whose increase is limited in this way. Koning didn't comment on that aspect of Bitcoins.
Koning explains that the Bitcoin "mining" involves supporting and verifying the network. (It isn't just make work.) While I will grant that this is valuable work, I don't favor a monetary base that only increases or whose increase is limited in this way. Koning didn't comment on that aspect of Bitcoins.
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